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SALVAGING THE OPPORTUNITY: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR CLARK
Michael J. Yelnosky*
In this Article, Professor Yelnosky responds to Professor Clark's critique of his previous article, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers
to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled,
Entry-Level Jobs. Professor Yelnosky first clarifies that Professor
Clark has adopted several of the points Professor Yelnosky originally
made in his earlier article. He then responds to the portions of
Professor Clark's article that challenge his prior conclusions. He
builds on and defends his previous arguments that: (1) testing is best
suited to uncover hiring discrimination for lower-skilled jobs; (2) disincentives to bringing tester lawsuits make it unwise to rely on private
parties and organizations to use testers sufficiently; (3) the EEOC
currently lacks the statutory authority to engage in or fund testing for
employment discrimination; and (4) Congress should amend Title VII
to expressly authorize EEOC participation in testing. Professor Yelnosky discusses the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIPJ as a potential model statutory framework. FHIP authorized the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund testing by
private groups and individuals and has proven to be an effective and
popular program for combatting housing discrimination.

INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, Professor Clark has not acknowledged the
many ways in which his reply 1 to my earlier article 2 borrows
from my work. To minimize any misunderstanding of the
content of my article created by Professor Clark's characterization, I feel compelled first to summarize my earlier

*
Assistant Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.S. 1982,
University of Vermont; J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
My thanks to Andrew Horwitz and Jonathan Mintz for their comments on a draft
of this Article. Amy Foran also provided her characteristically thorough evaluation
of a draft. David Bagus's research assistance was invaluable. Thanks also to the
editorial board and staff of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for
their technical support and editorial suggestions.
1.
Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing
and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1994).
2.
Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower·Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1993).
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article. 3 A summary also helps to identify the issues on which
Professor Clark and I genuinely disagree. Those issues will
be the primary focus of this response.
In my earlier article, I asserted that employment discrimination is still widespread. 4 I identified reasons why less
than an optimal number of Title VII cases challenging hiring
decisions have been filed. 5 I opined that this difference between the optimal and actual number of cases challenging
hiring decisions, which I described as an "enforcement void,"
was greatest with respect to cases challenging hiring decisions involving lower-skilled, entry-level jobs. 6 I suggested
that the use of testers 7 might be an effective technique to fill
this enforcement void. 8 The technique appeared promising
because it could generate meaningful evidence· of discrimination while imposing few costs on the "tested" employers. 9
Furthermore, I concluded that a tester who is not considered
equally for employment with other applicants on the basis of
a prohibited characteristic has standing to sue under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 10 In support of this conclusion, I showed that Congress created a right under Title
VII to be considered for employment regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. That right does not depend
on the applicant's willingness to entertain a job offer. 11
In his reply to my article, Professor Clark argues, as I did,
that there is reason to believe that employment discrimination persists. 12 He argues, as I did, that special obstacles to
suit help explain why Title VII is used more often to

3.
My prior work speaks for itself, but some readers' thirst for information
about testing for hiring discrimination may be quenched by reading the two Articles
in this volume.
4.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410.
5.
Id. at 410-11.
6.
Id. at 410-13.
7.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines testers as
"individuals who apply for employment which they do not intend to accept, for the
sole purpose of uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring practices." Notice No. N915-062, (2 Interpretations] EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) 'I 2168, at 2313-15 (Nov. 20,
1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance].
8.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 413-15.
9.
Id. at 414.
10. Id. at 415; Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Prohibited characteristics
under Title VII are race, color; religion, sex, and national origin. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1988).
li.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415-29.
12. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 2-3 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410.
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challenge discharges than hiring decisions. 13 He argues, as I
did, that using testers may be an effective means of uncovering hiring discrimination. 14 He argues, as I did, that testers
have standing to sue under Title VII to enforce their -right to
equal treatment. 15
After I concluded that testers who receive disparate treatment have standing to sue under Title VII, I suggested that
because of certain obstacles, relying on private groups and
individuals to use testers to fill the enforcement void might
be unwise. 16 I speculated that while the law in this area was
murky, testers might be threatened with common-law liability for breach of contract or fraud, and that lawyers intimately involved in recruiting, training, and orchestrating testers
for purposes of litigation might be threatened by possible
breaches of the rules of professional responsibility. 17 I suggested that these threats might deter the use of testers. 18 I
also predicted that testers might be underutilized because of
legal doctrines that could limit the available relief, including
attorneys' fees. 19
13: Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 5 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 411-13.
14. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 6 with_Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 4i3-15.
15. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 10-20 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at
415-29. Sub silentio, Professor Clark has adopted my positions as his own, and at
other times he misrepresents my previous work by suggesting his positions on these
issues are contrary to mine. Although Professor Clark acknowledges that he agrees
with my conclusion that testers have standing to sue under Title VII, Clark, supra
note 1, at 7 n.31, not once does he cite to my prior analysis in reaching the same
conclusion. For example, he does not acknowledge that I argued, as he now does,
that under the analysis articulated by William Fletcher in William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988), testers have standing to sue under
Title VII. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 417-29.
My hunch is that his role as an incorporator of the Fair Employment Council,
Clark, supra note 1, at 6 n.25, an organization established to "utilize testing to
address equal employment issues," Roderic V.O. Boggs et al., Use of Testing in Ciuil
Rights Enforcement, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 345, 348 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993)
[hereinafter CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE], has something to do with his desire
to claim the territory for himself. Regardless, his tactics are more consistent with
advocacy than scholarship. Cf., Paul F. Campos, Aduocacy & Scholarship, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 817, 850 (1993) (describing scholarship as communication that derives its
value from a pursuit of truth and advocacy as communication with no other purpose
than to achieve some instrumental goal).
16. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 429-45.
17. Id. at 446-59.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 429-45. In addition to attorneys' fees, I considered injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, nominal damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
Id. I questioned the soundness of a number of the decisions that limit available
remedies because they disregard Congress's purpose in Title VII to authorize
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I expected to find that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission) could exercise its investigatory and enforcement power to engage in testing to fill
the enforcement void. I discovered, however, that Congress
had intentionally limited the agency's investigatory authority
and did not grant it the power to use testers to enforce Title
VII.20
Thus, I concluded that testing would be an effective means
of supplementing the current Title VII enforcement scheme. I
was concerned, however, that private groups and individuals
would not step in to use testers to fill the enforcement void,
and I was certain the EEOC did not have the power to use
testing. 21 Therefore, I proposed that Congress amend Title
VII to authorize the EEOC to use testers to uncover and
remedy discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level
positions. 22 I favored a "public enforcement" model because
the EEOC already is authorized to litigate Title VII cases in
the public interest and because it seemed the most efficient
way to assure that testing would be used only in instances
where its potential benefits outweighed its costs. 23 I suggested, however, that "the Commission might contract with
private groups to engage in testing according to standards
and practices promulgated by the EEOC."24
Professor Clark questions the wisdom of limiting the use of
testers to uncovering discrimination in hiring for lowerskilled, entry-level jobs. 25 He does not share my concern that
private groups and individuals might be deterred from using
testers, 26 and he challenges my conclusion that the EEOC
does not have the statutory authority to engage in testing. 27
He ultimately agrees with my view, however, that Congress
should amend Title VII to give the EEOC a special role in
this area. 28 He is concerned, as a matter of public policy,
about testers making misrepresentations in an uncontolled

individual plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general to vindicate the rights of
others. Id. at 438 nn.164-65.
20. Id. at 459-69.
21.
Id.
22. Id. at 469.
23. Id. at 469-73.
24. Id. at 470 n.314.
25. Clark, supra note 1, at 20-23.
26. Id. at 25-26.
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. at 46.
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fashion when ostensibly applying for employment. 29 He concludes that Congress should amend Title VII to permit only
the EEOC or private groups authorized by the EEOC to use
testers who present false credentials to employers. 30
Professor Clark's unwillingness to acknowledge our common ground is disappointing because the EEOC currently is
reconsidering the methods it historically has employed to
enforce Title VII and is looking specifically at the role that
testers could play in a new enforcement focus at the agency. 31
Therefore, it is essential to illuminate further the important
enforcement issues posed by the use of testers. This response
to Professor Clark attempts to salvage the opportunity to
discuss constructively the role that testers could play in a
new era of Title VII enforcement.
Part I of this Article responds to Professor Clark's assertion
that testing should not be limited to uncovering discrimination
in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level positions as I had
proposed, but rather should be used to ferret out discrimination
in hiring for higher-level positions. I argue that Professor
Clark's enthusiasm for the technique has caused him to ignore
its inherent limitations. Part II reasserts my concern that it
might be unwise to assume that private groups and individuals
will engage in an optimal amount of testing. Part III defends
my conclusion that the EEOC currently lacks the authority to
fill the Title VII enforcement void through its own testing. Part
IV concludes with a discussion of a statutory scheme that
Congress should consider as a model in incorporating the use
of testers in the EEOC's enforcement arsenal. To uncover
housing and mortgage-lending discrimination, Congress
authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), in the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP), 32 to

Id. at 48.
Id.
31.
E.g., Commissioner-Led Tusk Forces Will Probe EEOC's Major Concerns,
1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 230, at AA-1 (Dec. 2, 1994) (reporting that three
task forces-focusing on charge processing, alternative dispute resolution, and the
relationship between the EEOC and state and local fair employment agencies
-were created by Chairman Gilbert Casselas to "address the major operational
concerns" at the EEOC); EEOC Chairman Faces Staggering Task With 94,000
Complaints on Docket, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 206, at AA-1 (Oct. 27, 1994)
(reporting that EEOC Chairman Casselas characterized testers as a "useful" tool,
while acknowledging that the EEOC had not yet addressed the possibility of using
testers in either investigations or litigation).
32. Fair Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 561, 101 Stat. 1942 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993)).
29.
30.
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fund testing by private groups and individuals according to
guidelines and standards set by Congress and the agency.
Congress should give the EEOC similar authority to use testers
to uncover and remedy hiring discrimination.
I. THE

Focus ON LOWER-SKILLED, ENTRY-LEVEL JOBS

I asserted in my earlier article that despite a persistent gap
in labor force participation between white and black
workers-attributable in part to discriminatory hiring practices33-Title VII is used most often to challenge discharges
rather than hiring decisions. 34 I asserted that this anomaly is
based on several disincentives to suits challenging hiring
decisions, 35 and that the resultant underenforcement problem
is particularly acute with lower-skilled, entry-level positions. 36
In hiring for such jobs, "'[c]ontact between the applicant and
the employer ... is typically fleeting,' the eventual outcome
and the make-up of the applicant pool are unknown to the
applicant, the applicant knows little about the decisionmakers,
and 'the process itself rarely signals exclusionary intent.' "37
Problems of proof, which are present in all hiring cases, may
be worse with lower-skilled jobs because generally there exists
little, if any, paper record. 38 Moreover, where the job in question pays a relatively low wage, potential plaintiffs are less
likely to have the resources to pay counsel a retainer or an

33. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410 & n.21.
34. Id. at 411. For instance, between 1989 and 1991, discharge cases outnumbered
hiring cases by approximately seven to one. Id. at 411 n.23.
35.
First, discharged employees may be likely to sue to protect the investment
of time and energy they have made in the firm, whereas an individual discriminated
against in hiring will have less incentive to sue, especially if she has subsequently
secured a job. Id. at 412. Second, discharged employees are more likely to have access
to the information that might lead them to suspect discrimination than those who
never have been employed by the firm. Id.; see also Ronald Turner, A Look at Title
Vll's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 237 (1994) (explaining that
an individual turned down at the hiring stage "most likely will not be in a position
to shape, and prove, a claim of discrimination" when that individual is not familiar
with the racial or gender makeup of the prospective employer's work force and does
not know the reason for, or person behind, the decision not to hire).
36. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 412-13.
37. Id. at 412 (quoting Michael Fix et al.,An Overview ofAuditing for Discrimination, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 1, 13-14).
38. Id. at 412.
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hourly fee, and the backpay remedy from which a contingency
fee might come is limited. 39
I suggested that the success of the testing technique in
identifying housing discrimination makes the technique a
plausible candidate to help fill the Title VII hiring discrimination enforcement void. 40 The success of testing in the
housing context seemed easiest to extrapolate to hiring discrimination in lower-skilled, entry-level positions because "the
hiring process for lower-skilled, entry-level positions is usually
a summary one, very similar to the rental of a housing unit." 41
As with housing, "'[i]t is possible to monitor ... these transactions without becoming involved in the kind of complex interpersonal exchanges that would entail outcomes based largely
on subjective criteria.' "42 Moreover, in selecting among
applicants for higher-skilled, upper-level positions, an employer
may expend significantly more time screening, testing, interviewing, and otherwise evaluating candidates' fitness for
employment. 43 Finally, I noted that feigning the qualifications,
knowledge, and experience necessary to test for discrimination
in hiring for some higher-skilled positions posed significant
problems for recruiting or training effective testers. 44
Professor Clark questions the wisdom of limiting testing to
lower-skilled, entry-level jobs. 45 I certainly agree with his
assertion that there are reasons to suspect widespread discrimination in hiring for jobs at all levels of the American
economy. 46 I cannot agree, however, with Professor Clark's
suggestion that using testers to improve the enforcement of
Title VII in the context of hiring for lower-skilled jobs would
waste resources. 47 First, as Professor Clark acknowledges, in
39. Id. at 412-13. At the time of my earlier article, I noted that it was too early
to tell whether the amendments to Title VII permitting awards of compensatory and
punitive damages, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)), might ameliorate this problem.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 412-13 n.35. Presently, I still am unaware of any empirical
studies that have addressed the issue.
40. Id. at 414.
41.
Id.
42. Id. (quoting Fix et al., supra note 37, at 34).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 415.
45. Clark, supra note 1, at 20-23.
46. Id. at 3; Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination
in Employment by Dauid A Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695, 1700-02 (1991).
47.
Professor Clark stated:
[S)ome economists hypothesize that race and sex discrimination is less present
in unskilled and blue collar work than for any other kinds of work .... The

158

UniveT'Sity of Michigan Journal of Law &form

[VOL.

28:1

many cities young unskilled blacks have exceedingly low levels
of employment, based at least in part on discriminatory hiring
practices. 48 A study conducted by his organization, the Fair
Employment Council (FEC),49 concluded that young black job
seekers often were denied lower-level jobs offered to whites
with similar credentials, and moreover, that the black applicant often was eliminated from the hiring process at an
earlier stage than his white counterpart. 50 In addition, the
FEC's own "enforcement testing''51 has focused on lower-skilled,
entry-level positions. 52
·

tester approach, therefore, could be wasted on the class of employers who engage
in the least amount of active discrimination in regard to the least attractive jobs,
when the real underenforcement problem could involve higher-level jobs which
pay a living wage.
Clark, supra note 1, at 22.
48. Id. at 22 n.111.
49. See supra note 15.
50. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410 n.22 (citing Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Fair
Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., Measuring Employment Discrimination
Through Controlled Experiments (May 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
51.
Enforcement-oriented testing is conducted with subsequent litigation in mind.
Research-oriented testing is conducted for the purpose of generating data for any
number of social science purposes. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 349.
52. Id. at 368 (acknowledging that as of 1992, "the [FEC's] testing activities ha[d]
concentrated on jobs for which the necessary hiring qualifications are relatively
limited").
Professor Clark also suggests that testing for lower-level hiring discrimination is
unnecessary based on his extraordinary assumption that the EEOC is doing an
adequate job investigating and screening cases involving claims of hiring discrimination in lower-level jobs. Clark, supra note 1, at 21. Professor Clark provides
no empirical evidence or even anecdotal support for this assumption, which is not
surprising because there is unanimity among current and former EEOC officials,
practitioners in the civil rights community, policy makers, and academics that the
EEOC's charge-processing system is fatally flawed and that change is necessary. In
June 1993, the departing general counsel of the EEOC stated bluntly that Title VII
"doesn't work .... [The] EEOC was established ... for the voluntary resolution of
disputes. But after setting up the administrative mechanism, it was never funded to
provide those services." Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need for New Direction
at OverwhelmedAgency, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 111, atAA-1(June11, 1993);
see also EEOC Must Change Approaches to Deal with Growing Workload, Officials Say,
1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at C-2, C-3 (Aug. 11, 1993) (reporting that in
August 1993 a former general counsel and several EEOC staffers told an American
Bar Association committee that the Commission must change the way it does business
to keep up with the burgeoning workload of employment discrimination charges filed
with the agency). A Commission official recently stated publicly that the EEOC was
encountering "the most difficult period in its history." EEOC Official and Attorneys
Discuss Challenges Posed by Record Charge Rate, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 54,
at A-13 (Mar. 22, 1994). The interim chair of the EEOC stated in 1994 that "the
EEOC's workload growth now far surpasses the point where making internal
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Professor Clark's challenge to my suggestion that disincentives to sue in hiring cases are greater in cases involving lowerlevel rather than higher-level positions deserves more serious
consideration. I did not acknowledge as clearly as I might have
that individuals who suspect discrimination in hiring for
upper-level positions are subject to many of the obstacles I
identified in the lower-level employment context. 53
I wrote that individuals challenging hiring decisions involving higher-skilled, upper-level positions have a "greater likelihood of success" than those challenging decisions involving
lower-skilledjobs. 54 Professor Clark correctly asserts that these
individuals also have difficulty proving their cases. Hiring
decisions for upper-level positions often are based largely on

adjustments or reorganizing will solve its problems." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
EEOC'S EXPANDING WORKLOAD: INCREASES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER
CHARGES CALL FOR NEW APPROACH 15 (1994) [hereinafter CALL FOR NEW APPROACH].
The head of the EEOC's office of program operations has stated: "[Bly any means we
use to measure caseload-charge processing time, age ofinventory, caseload size-the
positive indicators are down and the negative indicators are up." EEOC Budget Up
by 15. 7 Million as Part of 'lnuestment Package', 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26,
at C-6 (Feb. 9, 1994).
A prominent plaintiffs' attorney recently told a congressional committee that the
EEOC "is an absolute waste and should be abolished." Plaintiffs' Attorneys Call for
More Lawyer lnuoluement in EEO Disputes, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at
A-3, A-4 (Mar. 25, 1994) (quoting Robert Goodstein); see also CALL FOR NEW APPROACH, supra, at 14 (stating that officials and experts interviewed from both inside
and outside the EEOC agreed that change is necessary); Clyde Summers, Effectiue
Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 457, 482 (1992) (stating that "[b)ecause of the Commission's slow rate of
processing cases and the uncertainty that the Commission will bring suit, the great
majority of victims rely on private suits rather than on the Commission").
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently concluded that the extensive
processing times that charging parties can expect to face appear incompatible with
the Commission's mandate to ensure equality of opportunity by vigorously enforcing
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. CALL FOR NEW APPROACH, supra at
14. It recommended that Congress establish a commission of experts to develop legislative and administrative means which would enable the EEOC to better carry out its
mission. Id. at 15. The Senate Special Committee on Aging commissioned the GAO's
latest audit of the EEOC's charge processing system in response to complaints from
senior citizens about the length of time it was taking to resolve charges of age
discrimination in employment. GAO Calls for Outside 'Commission of Experts' to
Deuelop Strategies to Deal with EEOC Workload, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37,
at A-16 (Feb. 25, 1994).
'
53. Clark, supra note 1, at 23; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 964 (1982) ("Job candidates at the
managerial and professional level are under strong pressures to avoid being labeled
troublemakers. An individual decision to engage actively in litigation will usually be
highly risky, given the low probability of prevailing and the danger of alienating
present and potential future employers.").
54. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415.
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subjective factors that separate candidates with similar objec-·
tive qualifications. Employers evaluate a candidate's previous
work and educational performance to determine whether the
candidate meets threshold objective requirements; 55 they then
use various procedures to try to evaluate the candidate's
subjective qualities, such as sincerity, appearance, poise,
ability to understand and articulate conceptual matters,
leadership, ability to get along with others, and identification
with organizational goals. 56 As I mentioned in my original
article, under the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 57 a plaintiff must prove that an employer's
articulated, subjective, nondiscriminatory justification for its
hiring decision was a pretext for actual discrimination. 58 Thus,
where subjective factors predominate, as they do in hiring for
higher-skilled, upper-level positions, plaintiffs trying to prove
discrimination face an uphill battle.

55. Bartholet, supra note 53, at 955, 973.
56. Id. at 973, 996 (describing factors weighed heavily by a New York law firm
and assessment centers). By contrast, in many hiring situations for lower-level
positions an applicant may be able to show that an employer hires candidates based
on minimal objective qualifications. Id. at 1001.
57. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
58. Id. at 2747. Professor Clark also criticizes the disparate treatment model of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), suggesting that it does
not provide sufficient opportunity for plaintiffs to prove hiring discrimination cases.
Clark, supra note 1, at 5. According to Professor Clark:
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case ofracial
discrimination by alleging that (1) she applied for work for which she was
qualified; (2) she was turned down; and (3) the employer later hired a person of
a different race or sex. Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to create an issue ·of fact by showing some
legitimate reason, not based on race or sex, as to why the plaintiff was not hired.
The plaintiff must rebut the defendant's reason in order to prevail.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Professor Clark's criticism of the McDonnell Douglas
disparate treatment model is somewhat ironic. Only a few years ago, Professor Clark
criticized Professor David A. Strauss, who argued that because the Title VII disparate
treatment model was ineffective, the best way to accomplish the purposes of the
statute would be to encourage quota hiring. Clark, supra note 46, at 1707-09
(commenting on David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination
in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991)).
Professor Clark wrote that "disparate treatment lawsuits are not nearly so problematic as Strauss implies." Id. at 1696. Professor Clark argued for changes to Title VII
that would increase incentives to sue. Id. at 1706-07. He stated that "it may be much
·too early to dismiss the individual lawsuit as a form of behavior control." Id. at 1707.
Changes to Title VII that increased incentives to sue eventually were enacted in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Nevertheless, Professor
Clark now seems much less sanguine about the efficacy of the individual lawsuit.
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At this point, however, Professor Clark and I genuinely
part company. From his observation that subjective factors
may play a more important role in hiring for upper-level
positions than in hiring for lower-level jobs, Professor Clark
concludes that the "tester approach may be more necessary
and appropriate for high-level employment."59 This conclusion
ignores the fact that where subjective factors predominate,
testing is much less likely to identify discriminatory hiring
practices effectively. Thus, while Professor Clark and I may
agree that there is a regrettable enforcement void in the
context of hiring for higher-skilled, upper-level positions,
testing does not appear to be a viable enforcement option to
fill that void. 60
The success of testing in the housing area suggests that
testing might effectively be used to identify discrimination in
hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level jobs because the hiring
process for such jobs is somewhat like the process for renting
an apartment or even selling a house. 61 Blindly applying the
housing testing technique to test for discrimination involving
higher-skilled positions seems inappropriate, however, because "inore subjective factors legitimately may be considered
in [those] decisions than in decisions about selling or renting
housing. "62 The goal in testing is to produce pairs of testers
identical in all relevant characteristics so that any systematic
difference in treatment within the pair can be attributed to
discrimination based on race or sex or any other prohibited
characteristic. 63 In the area of fair housing, testers typically are
matched according to relatively few characteristics, such as
income, age, family size, and housing needs. 64 This matching
59. Clark, supra note 1, at 21.
60. See John C. Boger, Extending the Reach of the Audit Methodology: Comments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 399, 403 (explaining
that to state the limitation that testing works best in evaluating entry-level hiring
decisions merely acknowledges that the method is only one of a number of complementary civil rights enforcement techniques that can perform some useful tasks).
61. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 414.
62. Id.
63. James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The Urban Institute Audit Studies:
Their Methods and Findings, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15,
at 187, 190; Alex Y.K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An
Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 474 (1993)("1n a typical
testing situation, a black and white tester are paired and sent out to the targeted
entity with similar, if not identical, qualifications for whatever opportunities the
entity provides ... so that from the refusal of the black tester alone one can infer a
discriminatory decision.").
64.
Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 190-91.
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generally eliminates differences in the nondiscriminatory
factors that might justify disparate treatment of the two
testers. 65 Employment testers, on the other hand, must be
matched according to· additional factors. Age, appearance,
education, experience, openness, energy level, verbal skills,
mannerisms, personality, and interview style all may be
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to hire an
individual. 66
The more factors that might be lawfully relevant to the
outcome of a particular hiring decision, the more difficult
accurate matching becomes. 67 First, those responsible for
matching must attempt to identify all the applicant characteristics relevant to the particular firm being tested. Perfect
matches are impossible where all the worker characteristics
valued by the firm cannot be identified. 68 In hiring for lowerskilled, entry-level positions it is less likely that firms place
much weight on characteristics other than those on which
testers are matched. 69 Even if those responsible for matching
testers could predict accurately the attributes that would be
dispositive for the hiring decision, it would be impossible in
many instances involving higher-skilled positions to match
testers on those attributes. The Urban Institute has recognized this limitation in designing its hiring discrimination
studies using testers. The Institute instructs testers to withdraw from consideration for a job if they are asked to take a
test or attend a training session. 70 This would rule out testing
for many high-level positions where various personality and
intelligence tests are given routinely. 71

65.
Id.; see also Peter E. Millspaugh, Fair Housing Testing: Its Legal Status
and Policy Implications, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 223, 229 (1984) (describing how
testers should be matched to eliminate nondiscriminatory factors).
66.
Bartholet, supra note 53, at 976-77, 996; Heckman & Siegelman, supra
note 63, at 191; Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 404-05 n.4 (discussing a tester study
described in MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED,
OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991)).
67.
EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 7, at 'I 2168 n.5 (explaining that employment testers may have a more difficult and elaborate role to play than in the
housing context because they have the additional burden of appearing qualified for
the job in question if interviewed).
68.
James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, Response to Comments by John
Yinger, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 271, 271.
69.
See John Yinger, Audit Methodology: Comments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVlDENCE, supra note 15, at 259, 265, 268 (recognizing that firms consider more
characteristics when hiring for upper-level jobs).
70.
TURNER ET AL., supra note 66, at 21, 23.
71.
Richard M. Howe, Minding Your Business: Employer Liability for Invasion
of Privacy, 7 LAB. LAW. 315, 355 (1991) (reporting that written honesty tests,
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Further, despite sincere efforts to prepare matched testers
to respond uniformly in interviews, the substance of applicant
interviews can be quite variable and random, and the personal
dynamics that account for a successful interview are difficult
to plan for and predict. For example, if one considers the hiring
process for a tenure-track position on a law school faculty, two
candidates most likely will not be asked identical questions at
the national hiring conference or at a callback visit to the law
school. The content of those interviews depends to a large
extent on the priorities of the individuals who participate on
any particular day. Individual priorities are not always consistent, particularly when several interviewers are involved
simultaneously and certain group dynamics exert their influence. Moreover, matching the scholarly presentations of
testers would be quite difficult. On the one hand, the presentations would need to be sufficiently different to avoid detection.
On the other hand, the presentations would need to be sufficiently similar to be "matched."
These matching problems-the difficulty in identifying firmspecific preferences and in matching candidates on highly
variable and subjective characteristics-have been described
as the "Achilles heel" of the testing methodology. 72 If two tester
applicants are different with respect to relevant characteristics
that could not be identified or with respect to identifiable but
highly variable and subjective characteristics, there is room for
nondiscriminatory disparate treatment of the two applicants. 73
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that one instance of disparate
treatment constitutes discrimination. 74 Both testers might have
actually received nondiscriminatory treatment and consideration at that firm. 75

psychological and personality tests, physical exams, genetic screening, and handwriting analysis have become increasingly popular tools in hiring selection). For
example, a friend of mine recently interviewed for a position in the legal department of a Fortune 500 company. The company gave her an intelligence test after
the field of applicants had been narrowed to approximately five.
72. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 191.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id. If the protected-class tester has a slight edge in credentials as well as
other job-relevant characteristics, and the protected-class tester is treated less
favorably, then an inference of discrimination may be stronger. Boggs et al., supra
note 15, at 351. Giving the protected-class tester such an "edge" remains problematic,
however, if all the job-relevant characteristics are not identifiable or if they are highly
variable and subjective.
75. See Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 244 (questioning testing methodologies that count all instances of disparate treatment of testers as discrimination);
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One way to avoid some of these problems is to conduct
several tests of the same employer to see ifthe protected-class
testers regularly receive less favorable treatment. 76 However,
because an employer will likely have fewer openings for higherlevel positions, repeat tests might not be feasible.
Limiting testing for higher-skilled, upper-level hiring discrimination to the early phases of the hiring process likewise
may not be a viable solution. An attorney for the FEC has
written that wherever possible, each pair of testers in an
enforcement test should stay in the process until one is offered
employment so the other tester can claim that her Title VII
rights were violated. 77 This position recognizes that the
relationship between non-outcome aspects of the hiring process
and discrimination is somewhat tenuous. Being interviewed for
a shorter period of time or receiving fewer positive comments
is not necessarily evidence of unlawful disparate treatment.
One pair ofresearchers suggests that such evidence should not
ordinarily form the foundation of a discrimination claim. 78
Thus, the feasibility of testing in employment may not reach
to higher~skilled, upper-level positions. 79
The increased importance of subjective factors in hiring for
upper-level positions also raises greater concerns about
"experimenter effects" 80 on the reliability of the testing for discrimination. These effects may be more problematic in higherlevel testing because the contact between the applicant and the
employer is more intimate and more lengthy, and the outcomes

Yinger, supra note 69, at 267 (reporting that researchers agree that every instance
of disparate treatment does not constitute discrimination because there is no simple
way to distinguish systematic from random unfavorable treatment due to difficulties
in matching testers on all relevant qualifications).
76. See Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 355 (noting that it often is appropriate to
perform repeat tests of the same employer to determine whether the observed
differences in treatment were isolated or reflect a pattern or practice of discriminatory
behavior); Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 198 (stating that researchers
using testers to uncover hiring discrimination might not be able to conclude safely
that disparate treatment of testers constitutes discrimination until the protected-class
tester receives detrimental treatment in the aggregate or on average).
77.
Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 361.
78.
Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 228 n.8.
79.
See Fix et al., supra note 37, at 61; see also Bartholet, supra note 53, at 999
(noting that "[s]election systems on the upper level are ... likely to be multifactored
and discretionary, and therefore more difficult to analyze").
80.
Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 215-16. "Experimenter effects" can
exist because "'the experimenter is not simply a passive runner of subjects, but can
actually influence the results' of an experiment." Id. (quoting HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 66 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1975).
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tend to be based more on subjective factors. During the hiring
process a tester is not a passive observer. For example, the
tester can influence the results of the test by responding to
questions in a subtly negative way or by not making eye
contact with interviewers. 81 Therefore, the conscious and
subconscious motivations of testers are important. 82 As a
consequence, when conducting tests for social science research
some researchers prefer "blind" testing, a program design
which keeps testers unaware of both the theory being tested
and the fact that they are working in pairs. 83 As a practical
matter it would be very difficult to do blind testing, because
matching testers on several highly subjective characteristics,
such as openness in interviews, is best accomplished by
permitting the testers to view each other in simulated interviews.84

81. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991). Focusing on retaffcar negotiations, Ayres
recognized that in testing for discrimination on the basis ofrace or gender, individual
differences among the testers might influence the results of a lengthy negotiation,
even if the negotiating script was standardized. Id. at 825. For example, non-verbal
behavior inevitably has an impact on the effectiveness of testers: "Salespeople may
have offered certain testers a higher price not because of their race or gender, but because they blinked more often or opened the car door more quickly. In the end, the
results need to be discounted by this residuum of non-uniformity." Id. at 826.
82.
Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 215-16; see also Millspaugh, supra
note 65, at 233-34, 240 (cautioning that where evidence of discrimination is of a more
elusive nature, objective observation by testers may be impossible due to the
"formidable psychological and emotional commitment" required from testers); Oh,
supra note 63, at 499, 503-04 (proposing EEOC oversight of testing activity in
employment because hiring practices at the interview stage are highly subjective,
giving testers the opportunity to induce an employer to prefer other applicants by
"pretending to be inarticulate ... disorganized ... or ... uninterested").
In the context of enforcement testing, "testers must be willing to remain in contact
with the testing program and return occasionally to participate in legal proceedings
over an extended [time period]." Boggs et al., supra note 15,. at 350-51; see also
Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 223-24 (stating that because the success of tests rests
heavily on the indoctrination, training, and rehearsing of dedicated testers, "participation in fair housing testing may not be suited to those lacking a strong commitment
to the purpose for which the testing is undertaken"). That commitment from testers
should be confirmed before testing, which minimizes the possibility of blind testing.
Moreover, "[a] group that is obviously half black and half white ... will start trainees
thinking and perhaps making up their own mind about what the study is or how they
should behave. It makes more sense ... to keep participants from guessing by telling
them the purpose of the study .... " Yinger, supra note 69, at 260.
83.
Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 216; supra note 82.
84.
Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 351-52 (explaining that after testers receive
background training they are coached on and practice the details of testing and thus
during that latter phase "testers who will be paired work closely with and observe
each other, deyeloping a sense of teamwork and fostering a convergence of their
personal styles").
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Obviously, the dichotomy that I have suggested between
lower-skilled, entry-level jobs, and higher-skilled, upper-level
jobs is imprecise and merely descriptive. I believe testing
should be used to identify hiring discrimination as far "up" the
employment hierarchy as possible. My suggestion is that
generally the farther up one goes, the less reliable the testing
technique may be. Testing for discrimination in hiring for
higher-level positions raises questions of scientific reliability
and validitys5 that Professor Clark simply has not addressed.
Professor Clark's support for the use of testers to uncover
and remedy discrimination in hiring for higher-skilled, upperlevel positions raises two other important issues: the increased
costs employers often expend in evaluating persons to fill those
positions and the increased need for elaborate misrepresentations by testers to appear qualified for the positions.
As I mentioned in my original article, in selecting an applicant for a higher-level position, firms often expend significant time and money conducting interviews, administering
tests, checking references, and conducting other background
investigations. sG Moreover, because the pool of qualified applicants for these positions can be relatively small,s7 an employer
may lose a candidate with a bona fide interest in employment
by focusing its efforts on a tester.ss Because reliable testing for
discrimination in hiring may be difficult to conduct,s9 tests for
discrimination in this area may have few benefits. These few
benefits will not outweigh the costs incurred by many tested
employers. 90
Professor Clark offers little to alleviate these concerns. While
he acknowledges that employers must bear additional costs
associated with verifying the content of applications, 91 he
accepts these costs because testers have Title VII rights to
equal treatment. He concludes that because testers have
85. See Boger, supra note 60, at 402 (noting that testing organizations must
scrupulously adhere to scientifically valid testing procedures).
86.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 414.
87.
Bartholet, supra note 53, at 1003.
88.
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415.
89.
See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
90. See Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 240 (noting that the burden testers place
on the time, energy, and expenses of tested firms is difficult to justify where testing
is unwarranted); cf Ayres, supra note 81, at 822 n.18 (describing the features of
testing for discrimination in negotiations for automobile purchases intended to reduce
the amount of time a salesperson spent with an individual who had no interest in
buying a car).
91.
Clark, supra note 1, at 24-25.
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standing under Title VII, Congress made "an implicit policy
judgment that testing is a legitimate, approved activity and
that the benefits of weeding out discrimination outweigh the
costs to innocent employers who may be subjected to [testing]."92 As he acknowledges, however, there was "no discussion
of the tester approach in the legislative history surrounding the
initial adoption of Title VII." 93 Moreover, there is nothing in
the legislative history of the amendments to Title VII to
suggest that Congress ever made any judgment on the relative
costs and benefits of the use of testers to enforce Title VII.
Professor Clark also seeks to dismiss the cost issue by
asserting that if testers target only employers who are likely
to be engaging in discriminatory hiring practices, the number
of innocent employers tested will be small. 94 Identifying those
firms is easier said than done, 95 and without legislative action,
private groups and individuals are free to target whomever
they wish for testing. Finally, _ifl am correct that higher-level
testing tends to be unreliable, there are few, if any, benefits
to offset the costs to tested employers.
In addition to imposing additional costs on employers,
testing for hiring discrimination in higher-skilled, upper-level
jobs involves more detailed misrepresentations of testers'
qualifications than testing for lower-level jobs. "To 'appear
qualified,' testers might find it necessary to present false
credentials, bogus academic transcripts, made-up work histories, forged letters of reference, faked passports or work
authorizations, counterfeit licenses, falsified professional
ratings, perhaps even false security clearances."96

92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 24 n.118.
94. Id. at 25.
95.
Professor Clark offers one possible "targeting" technique. He suggests that
"employers could be targeted for testing when they exhibit a profile with no minority
or female employees, or serious underrepresentations in certain job categories." Id.
at 24 n.119. This technique is probably both underinclusive and overinclusive.
Certainly, many employers without "serious" racial or gender imbalances in their
workforce may engage in discriminatory hiring practices, and many with such
imbalances are not discriminating. However, to the extent that this technique would
reduce the number of tests of employers unlikely to be engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices, it may be one way to ameliorate the cost problem.
96. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 407 n.14 (quoting Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris,
President, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to the Hon. Evan J. Kemp, Chairman, EEOC (Feb. 12, 1991), in Equal Employment Advisory Council Letter on
Proposed Testing Policy at EEOC, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-2 (Feb.
14, 1991)).
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Professor Clark recognizes that testing conducted by presenting matched individuals who possess similar levels of
education and work experience does not raise the same problems as misrepresenting testers' qualifications for purposes of
testing. 97 He also acknowledges that it may be difficult to
find testers "with identical backgrounds, especially if the
testing is done for high-level employment as proposed in [his]
Article."98 He concludes that as a matter of public policy,
misrepresentations should only be permitted for testing in
limited circumstances. 99 Thus, Professor Clark proposes that
Congress should make it clear that only the EEOC should
have the authority to engage in or authorize testing that
depends on numerous significant misrepresentations. 100
I have asserted all along that coordination by the EEOC is
desirable in this area. Professor Clark and I disagree over
whether the EEOC currently is authorized to engage in its
own testing. He has challenged my conclusion that the EEOC
currently lacks the statutory authority to do so. His claim
warrants some comments ..
II. THE EEOC's INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY
Professor Clark challenges my conclusion that the EEOC
currently may not "employ its own testers or orchestrate the
use of testers by private groups. "101 To do so he creates a
straw man. He claims my conclusion is based on "a single
court decision that determined that the EEOC could not be
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because the
FTCA only authorized suits against criminal law enforcement
agencies." 102
·

97.
Clark, supra note 1, at 46.
98. Id.; see also Fix et al., supra note 37, at 34 (noting that because hiring for a
mid-level, white-collar position may be a complex transaction, "testing may be less
useful a tool unless the testers assume their own identities, which raises complicated recruitment ... issues").
99.
Clark, supra note 1, at 48.
100. Id.
101. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 462.
102. Clark, supra note 1, at 40 (referring to EEOC v. First Nat'l Bank, 614 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981), discussed in Yelnosky, supra
note 2, at 462 n.269).
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His characterization is unfair. I discussed that case in one
of many footnotes supporting a much simpler and more compelling argument. I argued that the investigatory powers of
the EEOC were specifically limited and carefully delineated
by Congress in response to concerns by certain lawmakers
that a powerful EEOC would infringe on employers' rights. 103
Therefore, the Commission may not employ an investigative
technique not authorized by Title VII, even if that technique
helps the Commission eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Nowhere in Title VII did Congress even arguably give
the Commission the power to engage in investigative techniques like testing. When investigating, the Commission is
authorized only to request from an employer information
relevant to a charge of discrimination by an employee, and
the EEOC has subpoena power to enforce compliance with
those requests. 104
I also showed that Congress limited the EEOC's power in
another relevant respect. The Commission has no authority
to commence an investigation until after a charge of discrimination has been filed. 105 Therefore, even if the Commission's investigatory power was broad enough to encompass
the use of testers, the Commission could not employ testers
to obtain evidence for the purpose of filing a charge of discrimination. 106
Professor Clark's assertion that the EEOC has authority to
implement its own testing program to uncover evidence on
which to base charges of discrimination ignores these
statutory limitations on the EEOC's power. He cites In re
Establishment Inspection of Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. 107 for
the proposition that:
The general rule is that an agency's investigative authority
extends to those techniques which are reasonable in the
light of the enforcement tasks that the agency confronts.
Where a specific technique is a reasonable extension of a
103. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 461. See generally id. at 459-69 for my complete
analysis of the statutory limitations on the EEOC's investigatory authority.
104. Id. at 460--63 (describing the EEOC procedures for filing a charge).
105. Id. at 463.
106. Id. at 463-69. I further argued that the EEOC could not use testers to
corroborate a charge already filed, because the EEOC must request information
from employers that it is investigating. Testing would be inconsistent with the
notice required by the request and subpoena system of Title VII. Id. at 469 n.302.
107. 13 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1994).
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basic statutory authority to investigate, the federal agency
"need not have specific regulatory authority for each and
every one of its inspection and investigational procedures."108
Professor Clark failed to mention that the court in KellySpringfield was discussing the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). 109 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit recently recognized what Professor Clark
ignores-that the statute authorizing OSHA investigations is
quite different from the statute authorizing EEOC investigations. In a case involving an employer's challenge to OSHA's
investigatory power, the court ruled that the employer's
reliance on a decision interpreting the EEOC's authority was
misplaced. 110 The court found that the EEOC decision was
not "relevant, because the EEOC's subpoena statute differs
significantly from that of OSHA. The EEOC's authorizing
statute specifically limits its subpoenas to the investigation
of discrete charges." 111 Unlike some other administrative
agencies created by Congress, the EEOC may not commence
a Title VII investigation "'merely on suspicion that the faw is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that
it is not.' " 112
Similarly, the power granted to the EEOC in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 113 is much broader
than that granted to it under Title VIL Under the ADEA, the
EEOC has investigatory authority independent of the filing of
a discrimination charge. 114 Thus, "[t]he Commission may, on

108. Clark, supra note 1, at 42 (quoting Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d at 1164).
109. Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d at 1164-65. The court's holding was directed to
OSHA's investigative powers: "OSHA need not have express authority for each and
every investigative technique." Id.
110. Reich v. Montana Sulphur & Chem. Co., 32 F.3d 440 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Id. at 446 (citing EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., 569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978);
EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988)).
112. Alyeska Pipeline, 836 F.2d at 447 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950)) (comparing the broad investigatory power of the EPA to
the more narrow authority of the EEOC).
113. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
114. See EEOC v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1992).
The ADEA gives the EEOC "the power to make investigations ... in accordance with
the powers and procedures provided in [the Fair Labor Standards Act]." 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(a) (1988). That power derived from the ADEA permits the EEOC to "investigate
and gather data" and to "enter and inspect [work] places and ... records, ... question
such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as ...
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its own initiative, conduct investigations" of ADEA violations, 115 and "[u]nlike the limited authority given the EEOC
under Title VII, ... the ADEA gives the EEOC authority to
investigate and enforce independent of individual employee
charges." 116
Perhaps recognizing that his argument disregards the
express limits in Title VII on the EEOC's power to investigate,
Professor Clark ultimately suggests that the use of testers is
not an "investigation" under Title VII and that the technique
is a "reasonable extension" of the power to investigate. 117 He
cites no direct support, however, for the assertion that testing
is not an investigation within the meaning of the statute. It is
irrelevant that sending testers to an employer may not be
particularly intrusive. The statute simply does not authorize
it. 118 Congress specifically limited the EEOC's authority when
necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision
... or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions .... " 29 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1988). To enforce the ADEA the EEOC may:
(1) investigate and gather data; (2) enter and inspect establishments and
records and make transcripts thereof; (3) interview employees; (4) impose on
persons subject to the Act appropriate recordkeeping and reporting requirements; (5) advise employers, employment agencies and labor organizations
with regard to their obligations under the Act and any changes necessary in
their policies, practices and procedures to assure compliance with the Act;
[and] (6) subpoena witnesses and require the production of documents and
other evidence . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 1626.15(a) (1994). In contrast, the EEOC's regulations for investigating
charges filed under Title VII are more limited. They authorize the agency to request
statements from the charging party, conduct a fact-finding conference, and issue
subpoenas to enforce requests for (1) the testimony of witnesses, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.15 (1994); (2) the production of evidence under a subpoenaed person's
control; and (3) access to evidence for the purpose of examination and copying. Id. §
1601.16. But cf. id. § 1601.15(d) (stating that the EEOC's authority to investigate
"is not limited" to the procedures outlined within this section).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (1994).
116. American & Efird Mills, 964 F.2d at 304; see also Yelnosky, supra note 2, at
464 n.275 (explaining that although the EEOC's investigatory power under Title VII
is more limited than that of the Federal Trade Commission or the Wage and Hour
Administrator, the EEOC nonetheless has broader power under the ADEA).
117. Clark, supra note 1, at 42.
118. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 461-62 n.267 (citing EEOC v. Western Elec. Co.,
382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974) (concluding that the EEOC did not have the authority
to serve interrogatories on an employer during the investigation of a charge because
the statute did not permit it); cf Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d
455, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that an agency cannot use an investigative
technique that is not authorized by statute).
Professor Clark also appears to suggest that I erroneously concluded that EEOC
testing would violate the Fourth Amendment. Clark, supra note 1, at 40. He states:
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it created and later amended Title VII. Wishing the statute
was drafted differently does not make it so. The Commission
simply "is not empowered to conduct general fact-finding
missions concerning the affairs of the nation's work force and
employers. "119
Professor Clark's challenge to my conclusion that the
EEOC may not orchestrate enforcement testing by others 120 is

The activity of the EEOC is unlikely to exceed the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment. Professor Yelnosky fails to consider that the judiciary's exertion
of constitutional control and its imposition of a standard requiring express
statutory authority varies with . . . the degree of intrusiveness of the investigative techniques on citizens' liberty, property, and privacy.

Id. If this is what Professor Clark is suggesting, he did not read my original article
carefully. I stated that "[t]here also would be no Fourth Amendment bar to the use
of testers by the EEOC." Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 480 n.363. Furthermore, I
discussed this conclusion in some detail. Id.
119. EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 820 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir. 1987) (declining to order enforcement of an EEOC subpoena based on an invalid charge), vacated
on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1'019 (1988). The court also stated that "[t]he only
legitimate purpose for an EEOC investigation is to prepare for action against an
employer charged with employment discrimination, or to drop the matter entirely if
the ... charge ... [is] unfounded." Id. In 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit cited this same statement from Ocean City Police Deparment to demonstrate
the limits of the EEOC's investigatory powers under Title VII. American & Efird
Mills, 964 F.2d at 304 (distinguishing Ocean City Police Dep't on the grounds that
Title VII limits the investigative authority of the EEOC in the absence of any
independent statutory authority like that granted under the ADEA).
Professor Clark also asserts that under Service Founding Co. v. Donovan, 721 F.2d
492 (5th Cir. 1983), the EEOC could engage in testing to verify the accuracy ofEE0-1
reports submitted to the EEOC. Clark, supra note 1, at 44-45 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-8(c)(3) (1988)). Assuming, arguendo, that Service Foundirig, which involved
OSHA's power, applies to the EEOC, the enforcement testing Professor Clark and I
have been discussing would not be conducted simply to verify the content of EE0-1
reports. EE0-1 reports are filed annually by employers oflOO or more employees and
detail the racial and gender composition of their work forces by job classification. 29
C.F.R. § 1602. 7 (1994). Testing could not confirm, for example, that 20% ofa reporting
employer's clerical workers are black or female. Testing is conducted to determine
whether the employer is engaged in discriminatory hiring practices.
120. Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40. Professor Clark also points to statutory
provisions which he asserts give the EEOC authority to assist employers in structuring internal testing programs and to engage in research to determine the extent
of hiring discrimination. Id.
Here I agree with Professor Clark. I have never suggested that the EEOC
currently is not authorized to assist employers interested in structuring internal
testing programs. The EEOC has the power "to furnish to persons subject to this
subchapter such technical assistance as they may request to further their compliance with this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3) (1988).
The EEOC also may use its own testers to research the extent of hiring discrimination or, with funds appropriated by Congress, finance the use of testers by
others to conduct similar research. The Commission may "make such technical
studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this subchapter
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likewise not persuasive. Professor Clark argues that under
section 2000e-8(b), 121 "[i]t is ... possible that the Commission
has the statutory authority to help finance a testing program
undertaken by a state agency." 122 In making this argument,
Professor Clark ignores the fact that the Commission's power
under section 2000e-8(b) to "contribute to the cost of research
and other projects of mutual interest undertaken by" state
and local fair employment agencies is limited to the expenditure "of funds appropriated specifically for such purpose." 123
Even if enforcement testing fits within the definition of "research and other projects," unless Congress appropriated
money to the EEOC for it to assist state agencies in enforcement testing, the EEOC may not do so.
Similarly, contrary to Professor Clark's assertion, 124 the
EEOC does not appear to have the authority under section
2000e-4G)(l) to train private organizations that desire to set
up testing programs. That provision requires the Commission
to establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute (TATI)
"through which the Commission shall provide technical assistance and training regarding the laws and regulations enforced
by the Commission." 125 The provision was intended to ensure
that individuals and firms subject to Title VII received information that would help them comply with the law. There is
nothing in the language of the statute or in the legislative
history to suggest that TATI would be used to supplement
the enforcement activities of private groups and individuals.
In fact, the TATI was established at least in part to
encourage voluntary compliance with Title VII in order to

and ... make the results of such studies available to the public." Id. § 2000e-4(g)(5).
However, this statutory provision does not authorize enforcement testing.
121. In conducting its investigations, the Commission is authorized to
cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the administration of
State fair employment practices laws and, with the consent of such agencies,
may, for the purpose of carrying out its functions and duties under this subchapter and within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such
purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other projects of
mutual interest undertaken by such agencies ....
Id. § 2000e-8(b).
122. Clark, supra note 1, at 38 n.192 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988)).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
124. Clark, supra note 1, at 39.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
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reduce the need for enforcement activity by the EEOC and
others. 126
Professor Clark also relies on section 2000e-4(g)(l) in support
of his assertion that the EEOC currently has the authority to
orchestrate the use of testers by others. There, Congress gave
the EEOC the power "to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both
public and private, and individuals." 127 Professor Clark writes
that "[t]his provision provides a reasonable basis to argue that
the EEOC is empowered to work with private individuals,
private organizations like the Fair Employment Council, and
even state agencies" to target and test employers for hiring
discrimination that have work forces in which minorities and
women seem to be underrepresented. 128 However "reasonable"
Professor Clark's argument might be, it ignores the fact, as I
previously set forth, that Congress specifically limited the
EEOC's Title VII investigatory authority. That . limited
authority simply does not include the power to engage in
enforcement testing. Congress likely would not have
empowered the EEOC to authorize third parties to do some-

126. "An employer or other entity covered" is not excused from compliance with
Title VII "because of any failure to receive technical assistance under this subsection." Id. § 2000e-4(j)(2) (emphasis added); 138 CONG. REC. S16,312-03 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("My hope is that as a result of the
increased education, training, and technical assistance ... [employer] compliance
... will be improved.").
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(l) (1988). Professor Clark also suggests that this
provision might permit the EEOC to share information obtained from EE0-1 reports
with state agencies, private groups, and individuals to assist them in targeting
employers for testing whose work forces reflect an imbalance suggestive of discriminatory hiring practices. See supra note 120. While it might permit the EEOC to
share EE0-1 information with state and local government agencies, see infra note 136
(discussing authority for the EEOC to share information with another federal agency),
section 2000e-8(e) prohibits the EEOC from making "public in any manner whatever
any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this
section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such information." EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 592 n.l (1983) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e)); id. at 603-04 (holding that a charging party is not a member
of the public to whom disclosure of information is prohibited ifthat information is in
the charging party's own Title VII investigation file, but that a charging party is a
member of the public to whom disclosure is prohibited ifthe information is in another
party's file, even ifthe information is relevant to the charging party's case). Therefore,
section 2000e-8(e) prohibits the EEOC from sharing EE0-1 reports with private
groups or individuals unless they are charging parties and the EE0-1 information is
in their file. Id. at 604.
128. Clark, supra note 1, at 38.
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thing Congress had not permitted the EEOC to do on its
own.129
Therefore, when issuing regulations, the EEOC may not
expand its jurisdiction or otherwise exceed the authority
granted to it by Congress. Congress gave the Commission the
power to "issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of [Title VII]. "130 The Supreme
Court has held that EEOC substantive regulations 131 are merely persuasive. 132
.
Regardless of whether an EEOC regulation coordinating,
directing, orchestrating, or funding testing by others would be
deemed substantive or procedural, promulgation of such a rule
would not be a valid exercise of the EEOC's power. A court will
defer to EEOC substantive regulations, but only to the extent
warranted by the thoroughness with which the agency considered the regulation, the validity of the agency's reasoning
in support of the regulation, and the extent to which the
regulation is consistent with earlier and later pronouncements
of the agency. 133 Where the content of a regulation is contrary
to congressional intent, it is not entitled to any deference. 134

129. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1163, 1180-81
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (explaining that the administrative apparatus established by Congress
for the use of other agencies by the Inspector General "was intended to delegate
effective power to investigate certain matters within the scope of [the Inspector
General's} authority") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp.
791, 801 (D. Mass. 1956) (explaining that the statutory authority given to a Senate
subcommittee is the maximum limit on its power because a Senate committee "could
not delegate what it did not have"); In re Barnes, 116 F. Supp. 464, 467 (N.D.N.Y.
1953)(explaining that the subpoena power delegated by Congress to an administrative
agency "must remain within the bounds of the legislative grant . . . and in investigatory matters should be conferred in express and explicit terms for that
purpose"); cf. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1189-90 (6th Cir.
1982) (prohibiting the EPA from using private contractors to inspect regulated
workplaces for compliance with the Clean Air Act where Congress did not so authorize
the EPA, even though forbidding the use of contractors might have hampered or
crippled the inspection program).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988) (emphasis added). A regulation or rule that
regulates "the manner in which an administrative agency carries out its administrative function and responsibilities ... is to be deemed procedural." Associated
Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 809 (4th Cir. 1983).
131. "[A] regulation or rule [that] enforces rights or imposes definite obligations
on the parties ... is ordinarily considered substantive." Associated Dry Goods, 720
F.2d at 809.
132. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
133. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
134. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991); Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 142-45.
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Similarly, procedural regulations are valid only if they are
"reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation. "135 If, by regulation, the EEOC attempted to coordinate,
direct, orchestrate, or fund testing by others, it would be acting
contrary to Congress's intent to limit the agency's investigatory
power. The EEOC cannot expand its investigatory power
through its rulemaking authority, because the expansion would
not be reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation. 136
Thus, I maintain that before the EEOC may conduct its own
enforcement testing program or orchestrate enforcement
testing by others, Congress must authorize it to do so. I also
continue to maintain that one reason Congress should authorize this testing is because of the obstacles to the use of testers
faced by private individuals and groups. I am still concerned
that insufficient remedies may be available under current law
to encourage an optimum amount of private tester litigation.

135. Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).
136. E.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257 (holding that a regulation extending the reach of Title VII extraterritorially had no support in the plain language of
the statute); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142-45 (holding that a regulation predating the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act that interpreted pregnancy discrimination as discrimination based on sex was not supported by the legislative history of Title VII);
see Zarr v. Barrow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs exceeded its statutory authority by requiring that applicants for Indian
Higher Education Grants have at least one-quarter Indian blood); Central Forwarding,
Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1284 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Interstate Commerce
Commission exceeded its statutory authority in regulating labor compensation in the
trucking industry); California v. Block, 663 F.2d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the Department of Agriculture exceeded its authority in regulations defining "gross
negligence" in connection with the Food Stamps Act); cf Jackson, 961 F.2d at 584-85
(holding that an EEOC regulation permitting the agency to reconsider a no-cause
finding and issue a new right-to-sue letter, effectively tolling the 90-day limitations
period triggered by issuance of the first right-to-sue letter, was valid because {1) it
facilitated the Commission's processing of charges, (2) Congress intended that
discrimination claims be resolved administratively, (3) the power to reconsider is
inherent in the power to decide, and (4) it did not expand the scope of coverage of Title
VII or create additional rights under the Act); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC,
720 F.2d 804, 810-11 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that EEOC procedures for disclosing
information procured in an investigation to the charging party but not to the
respondent, unless the charging party decides to commence an action in federal court,
are valid because they are consistent with the statutory scheme); Emerson Elec. Co.
v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that a memorandum of
understanding between the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
and the EEOC under which the agencies share information and forward complaints
where appropriate is a valid procedural rule because Congress intended for them to
cooperate).
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Moreover, as I discuss in Part III, testers and their counsel
might be deterred by state common-law causes of action and
attorney disciplinary rules that could be used against them. 137
In light of these obstacles, depending on private groups and
individuals to fill the Title VII enforcement void by using
testers seems unwise. Professor Clark's challenge to this suggestion has not persuaded me otherwise.
III. OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF TESTING
BY PRIVATE PARTIES
To a large extent, my treatment of the relief issues differs
from Professor Clark's in emphasis. When I surveyed the law
in this area, I concluded that under existing doctrine significant relief might be denied to prevailing party testers,
which could result in denial of their requests for attorneys'
fees. 138 I was not unequivocal. However, in light of the possibility that testers might be denied significant relief and fees,
I suggested that as a matter of policy, private groups should
not be relied on to fill the Title VII enforcement void through
testing. In contrast, Professor Clark is reluctant to acknowledge the existing law in this area that might be used to
the detriment of testers. Rather, he suggests there is no reason
to be concerned about incentives to private tester litigation. 139
His position seems unduly optimistic and in some instances
superficial.
First, Professor Clark attempts to dismiss my concern that
testers "may not be able to obtain injunctive relief for violations of their rights under Title VIf" 140 My concern springs

137. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 429-30.
138. In my original article, I explained in detail the Supreme Court's attorneys'
fees jurisprudence. Id. at 430-34. Based on the cases surveyed, I concluded that "a
tester must obtain actual relief on the merits of the claim that materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the tester.... [and) the relief must be more than de minimis
or purely technical." Id. at 434. Injunctive relief or a substantial damage award would
satisfy these standards. Professor Clark has not challenged my conclusion that a
declaratory judgment or a nominal damage award would not. But see infra note 187
(discussing Professor Clark's suggestion that a declaratory judgment or nominal
damages might support an award of attorneys' fees). Thus, the following discussion
focuses on the likelihood of testers obtaining injunctive relief or substantial damages.
139. Clark, supra note 1, at 25-26.
140. Id. at 26-28 (discussing Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 435).
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from an analysis of Title VII cases in which courts had denied
prevailing plaintiffs injunctive relief. 141 Various justifications
were offered by courts in support of these decisions denying
injunctive relief: (1) there was no evidence of widespread,
pervasive discrimination in the record; (2) there was no .
evidence that the discriminatory practice that harmed the
plaintiff would continue in the future; and (3) the plaintiff was
no longer employed by the defendant and therefore not likely
to benefit personally from any change in the employer's hiring·
practices. 142 I suggested that these justifications could be used
to deny prevailing testers injunctive relief.
Professor Clark seems to agree. He acknowledges that an
injunction is mandatory only "when a plaintiff produces 'abundant evidence of a consistent pattern of past discrimination and
the absence of evidence ... of a reasonable possibility of future
compliance.' "143 Thus, evidence of widespread discrimination
may be a prerequisite to an injunction. 144 Moreover, as Professor Clark further acknowledges, a district court is free to deny
injunctive relief to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff where
"something in the record either shows that the employer has
ended its discrimination in a manner which makes a reoccurrence unlikely or which reveals a structural impediment that
would prevent the plaintiff or members of her class fro in being
harmed in the future." 145
Recognizing that a "structural impediment" to future harm
may be a basis for denying an injunction to a prevailing Title
VII plaintiff is acknowledging the point I tried to make in my
earlier article. I expressed concern that courts may refuse to
grant prevailing Title VII testers injunctive relief on the
grounds that they will not personally benefit from any change
in the employer's practices because testers "are not employees
of the defendant or likely to become employees." 146
141. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 434-38 & nn.162-65 (citing 16 cases that supported
my assertion). I took note of one case that held injunctive relief is appropriate
whenever a Title VII violation is found. Id. at 436 n.162 (citing Berkman v. City of
New York, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983)). Professor Clark seems comfortable resting
his analysis on that case rather than the others. Clark, supra note 1, at 26.
142. Id.
143. Clark, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting RoBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 207 (1992)).
144. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 436 n.163.
145. Clark, supra note 1, at 27.
146. Id. at 437. Professor Robert Belton, author of the Title VII remedies treatise
relied on by Professor Clark, agrees that a district court may properly deny injunctive
relief to a "discriminatee [who] does not seek reinstatement and would not benefit
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His only response to the suggestion that prevailing testers
could be denied injunctive relief on those grounds is the
decision in Fair Employment Council v. BMC Marketing
Corp. 147 Professor Clark reads that decision as permitting
tester plaintiffs, who received allegedly discriminatory treatment from an employment agency, to amend the portion of
their complaint seeking injunctive relief to include averments
that they were likely to return to the employment agency in
the near future as bona fide applicants and that the agency
had a settled policy of racial discrimination. 148 Professor Clark
misreads the case. The court concluded that the tester plaintiffs did not have standing149 to sue the defendant employment
agency for an injunction that would alter the agency's referral
practices because the tester plaintiffs had not made sufficient
allegations that they were "threatened with any future
illegality." 150 While the court remanded the case "for the district court to exercise its sound discretion over whether to
permit amendment," the court suggested that an allegation
that the defendant had a settled policy ofracial discrimination,
even if coupled with a claim that the plaintiffs actually intended to return to BMC as job applicants, would not be a sufficient indication of a likelihood of future injury .151 The testers
alleged that their treatment by the defendant was part of" 'a

personally from the injunctive relief." BELTON, supra note 143, at 208-09 & n.62
(citing Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Professor Clark himself acknowledges this is a sufficient basis for denying injunctive
relief when he cites favorably two cases that I had referred to in my earlier article,
in which courts held the prevailing Title VII parties were not entitled to an injunction
because they had voluntarily left the workplace. Clark, supra note 1, at 27 n.133
(citing Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1990); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr.,
671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982)).
147. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
148. Clark, supra note 1, at 27.
149. The court's use of the "standing" label is unfortunate. As I mentioned in my
original article, the question of whether a plaintiffs statutory rights were violated-the standing question-is analytically separate from the question of the relief
available for that violation. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 427 (maintaining the fact that
the plaintiff would not have accepted a job offer might affect the remedies available,
but that it is not relevant to the standing issue). Professor Clark is incorrect in stating
that I am merely "revisiting the standing question in an altered form." Clark, supra
note 1, at 25. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), where it held that after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in the plaintiffs discharge from
employment did not bar the plaintiffs ADEA suit challenging her discharge but was
relevant to the remedies available for any statutory violation. Id. at 883-87.
150. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1272.
151. Id. at 1274-75.
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pattern, practice and policy of employment discrimination on the
basis of race.' "152 The court said that the plaintiffs' allegations
did not "indicate that future violation of [the tester plaintiffs']
rights is even remotely probable."153 "Their usefulness as testers
is minimal because they are now known to [defendant] ....
Their adversarial relationship with [defendant] ... as well as
their established record as deceivers, make it highly implausible
that they would ever return as bona fide job seekers." 154
The same rationale could be used in most tester cases. Once
an employer knows a tester, it is unlikely that the tester could
be used to test for discrimination by that employer in the future. Moreover where testers must misrepresent their
qualifications to appear qualified, they will not apply to the
employer as a bona fide applicant. Finally, the court recognized
that even if the testers could allege that they intended to
return as candid~tes for employment, they would have no control over whether they would be subjected to discrimination at
the hands of the defendant in the future. 155
The most important point is that the court in BMC Marketing did exactly what I had predicted. It held that "[t]o pursue
an injunction or a declaratory judgment, ... tester plaintiffs
must allege a likelihood of future violations of their rights
156
•••• "
Thus, it is undisputable that prevailing-tester plaintiffs
are not guaranteed injunctive relief that would support an
award of attorneys' fees. 157 I continue to believe it is unwise to
cling to a hope that the courts eventually will grant prevailing
testers full injunctive relief on a widespread scale.
Professor Clark also challenges my suggestion that testers
may not be able to overcome these potential obstacles to

152. Id. at 1274 (quoting from appellant's complaint).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1273 (second emphasis added). The court's decision to treat the request
for declaratory reliefand injunctive relief together is problematic. As I mentioned in
my original article, there is no apparent justification for courts to deny declaratory
relief under Title VII to a prevailing plaintiff who no longer works for the employer
and cannot show a likelihood of doing so. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 439-40. Requiring
a showing of possible future harm for a declaratory judgment ignores the personal
nature of the remedy. Id. The declaratory judgment serves simply as a determination
that the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights. Id.
157. I tried to make it clear in my original article that some decisions denying
injunctive or declaratory relief to non-employee plaintiffs were probably unsound
doctrinally, or at least inconsistent with other decisions granting relief to Title VII
prevailing parties. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 437-38 nn.164-65, 439-40 n.172.
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injunctive relief through the class action mechanism. 158 I
asserted that under Supreme Court decisions prohibiting
"across the board" class actions in Title VII cases, testers who
do not have a genuine interest in working for the employer
defendant may not be permitted to represent a plaintiff class
of bona fide applicants. 159 In East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 160 the Supreme Court stated that in
an employment discrimination class action "a class representative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest
and suffer the same injury' as the class members." 161 Otherwise, the Court concluded, there is no way to assure the
named plaintiff will adequately represent those who may
have been victims of discrimination. 162
In fact, a district court has read Rodriguez in precisely the
way I suggested. 163 That court held that testers who had
claimed that they received incomplete information about the
availability of rental housing because of their race were prohibited from representing a class consisting of individuals
who also received incomplete information but had a bona fide
interest in ~ousing in that area. 164 The court wrote that
"[w]hatever injury a tester plaintiff may suffer ... by virtue
of or attendant to his intelligence-gathering activities, this
injury is qualitatively different from the injury allegedly
suffered by [bona fide renters]. "165 The court explained:
An injured renter plaintiff has allegedly been denied an
opportunity to rent a dwelling because of his race, thereby resulting in his living in a segregated neighborhood to
his detriment; a tester plaintiff asserting a claim for relief
based upon racial steering ... may likely claim only that
he has been denied only the "provision of services" because of his race, as the tester plaintiff has no intent
whatsoever to rent a dwelling from the person or agency
he questions. As a different injury ... accrues to a tester
plaintiff from that which accrues to a renter plaintiff,

158. Clark, supra note 1, at 28-29.
159. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 438 n.166.
160. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
161. Id. at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 216 (1974)) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 405-06.
163. Turner v. A.B. Carter, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 360, 364 (E.D. Va. 1980).
164. Id. at 366-70.
165. Id. at 367.
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such difference will preclude his designation by the Court
as a class representative for those claiming monetary
damage from being steered into a racially segregated
neighborhood. 166
Although courts are not unanimous on this issue, 167 my point
remains a valid one. The class action vehicle may not be available to tester plaintiffs who wish to overcome the obstacles
that exist in individual actions brought by testers. Likewise,
relying on the opportunity of a sponsoring tester organization
to sue to obtain significant relief and attorneys' fees seems
unlikely to result in an optimal amount of testing. 168 As I
mentioned in my original article, an organization that can
show it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's alleged
discriminatory hiring practices would have standing to sue
under Title Vll. 169 Once again, however, Professor Clark is
quite sanguine about the BMC Marketing decision, in which
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the FEC
standing. 170 He ignores severe limits placed by the court on the
types of organizations that would have standing and the relief
available to them.
Those limits again suggest to me that relying on private
groups and individuals to engage in an optimal amount of testing is unwise. The court concluded that the FEC had standing
based on the allegation that discrimination by the defendant
agency interfered with the FEC's goals of promoting equal opportunity through community outreach, public education,
counseling, and research projects. 171 It rejected the FEC's claim
that the expense of testing the defendant was an injury that
would support a claim for organizational standing. 172 Thus, the
standing recognized by the court in BMC Marketing is limited
to organizations that engage in broad equal employment opportunity efforts. I am not optimistic that there are a sufficient
number of organizations nationwide to result in an optimum
amount of testing. Moreover, the court held that the
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. See Open Rous. Ctr., Inc. v. Samson Management Corp., 152 F.R.D. 472
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting testers to represent a class including individuals who
actually intended to rent housing).
168. Clark, supra note 1, at 30-31.
169. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 424 n.93.
170. Clark, supra note 1, at 30-31.
171. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1276.
172. Id.
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organization had standing only to redress perceptible harm to
its programs caused by the defendant's discrimination against
bona fide job seekers. 173 Discrimination against the testers would
only be evidence of discrimination against bona fide applicants,
and the organization would thus have to show that discrimination against bona fide applicants "perceptibly impaired" its nontesting equal employment opportunity programs. 174 I am
certainly not convinced this current regime will result in
sufficient testing to fill the Title VII enforcement void.
Next, Professor Clark challenges my prediction that prevailing tester plaintiffs may not recover sufficient money
damages to obtain attorneys' fees. 175 After reviewing awards
given to prevailing testers in housing cases I opined that
"testers are likely to recover only modest amounts, which
may not be sufficient to support a fee award." 176 Professor
Clark responds by saying "[i]t. would not be surprising if
juries find that erecting discriminatory barriers to employment is more serious than discrimination in housing, and
thus warrants higher damages." 177
This wishful thinking seems a flimsy foundation for a policy
decision about how best to encourage an optimal amount of
testing. In fact, the FEC and the individual plaintiffs in the
BMC Marketing case recently settled with the defendant for a
total of $6000, inclusive of attorneys' fees, compensatory
damages, and costs. 178 This is certainly not the kind of settlement that will encourage groups to undertake testing.

173. Id. at 1277.
174. Id.
175. Clark, supra note 1, at 25, 31-33.
176. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 443 (footnote omitted), questioned in Clark,
supra note 1, at 25, 31-32. Professor Clark asserts that in describing Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Molovinsky, No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), I mentioned that the jury awarded each of two tester plaintiffs
$10,000 in punitive damages, Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 443 n.185, but "did not
further discover that each of the tester plaintiffs recovered an additional $5000 in
compensatory damages." Clark, supra note 1, at 31 n.156. Although I did not
discuss the punitive and compensatory damages awards together, on the page
following my discussion of the punitive damage award in Molouinsky, I mentioned
that the jury "provided each of (the) two employment tester plaintiffs $5000 in
compensatory damages for sexual harassment in the course of applying for placement services with an employment agency." Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 444 n.189.
177. Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
178. Racial Discrimination: Job Referral Agency Will Pay $6,000 to Settle Bias Suit
Inuoluing Testers, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at D-10 (Feb. 27, 1995).
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Moreover, Professor Clark acknowledges that "low awards
[in housing cases] continue[] in some courts." 179 Since my
original article has been published, the author of a law review
note surveyed awards in fair housing cases brought by testers
and concluded that courts rarely award compensatory damages
in excess of $5000. 180 The note catalogued some of the more
popular reasons expressed to justify lower compensatory
damage awards to testers than to bona fide house seekers. 181
Some courts have stated that any injury suffered by testers
may be offset by the pleasure they derive from participating
in enforcing the civil rights laws. 182 Some have noted that compensatory damages are less important to those testers who
receive compensation from their sponsoring organization. 183
Finally, some justify the lower awards by noting that the
testers may be expecting the discrimination. 184 Despite
Professor Clark's hopes, these reasons certainly could be used
to justify low awards to testers in employment cases. Recognizing this propensity of courts to make low awards in housing
cases, the author of the note argued that damages must be
increased and made easier to collect in tester cases in order to
encourage increased litigation of tester cases by the private
and public interest bar. 185 This is the simple point I was trying
to make.
Punitive damage awards under the Civil Rights Act of 1991
might not solve this problem either. Punitive damages are not
awarded routinely. Instead, they are available in Title VII
cases only where the defendant's acts were maliciouspromoted or accompanied by ill will, spite, or grudge-or
wanton~one in reckless or callous disregard of or indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. 186 If the compensatory and

179. Clark, supra note 1, at 32 n.157.
180. Alex S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An Economic
Approach to Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEO. L.J. 2727,
2748 (1993).
181. Id. at 2746 nn.89-90.
182. Id. at 2746 n.89 (citing United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th
Cir. 1992); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9212, at *26, 1987 WL 18393, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987)).
183. Id. at 2746 n.92 (citing Coel, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *17, 1987 WL 18383,
at *7).
184. Id. at 2746-47 (citing Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 348 (N.D.
Ind. 1984)).
185. Id. at 2745, 2752-53, 2766.
186. E.g., Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 823 F. Supp. 1475, 14 79-80 (W.D. Wis.
1993) (holding that the defendant's failure to conduct an investigation into an alleged
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punitive damage awards recovered by prevailing employment
testers are within the $5000 figure, district courts are well
within their discretion to deny those testers any attorneys'
fees. 187 Thus, my concern that adequate remedies may not be
available to promote private tester suits remains.
Those concerns are not alleviated by Professor Clark's suggestion that attorneys' fees will be available to prevailing
tester plaintiffs under a 1991 amendment to section 2000e of
Title Vll. 188 I explored this possibility in my original article
and concluded that the provision was not intended to apply-nor could it be read to apply-to prevailing testers seeking attorneys' fees unless the employer had a mixed motive
for the disparate treatment of the testers. 189
Professor Clark acknowledges, as I originally wrote, that
the provision was passed by Congress in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 190
There the Court held that a plaintiff who showed that an
action taken by her employer was motivated both by unlawful discrimination and lawful considerations was entitled to
no relief if the employer proved it would have made the same
decision absent the unlawful motive. 191 In contrast, section
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) was intended to permit a district court to
grant to plaintiffs in these so-called "mixed motive" cases the
attorneys' fees generated in establishing the employer's

hostile work environment, while negligent, was not a callous or reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights).
187. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 444-45 & nn. 191-96. However, Justice O'Connor,
concurring in Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992), wrote that a nominal damage
award might support a grant offees, considering "the extent ofrelief, the significance
of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served." Id.
at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I suggested in my original article that under Justice
O'Connor's reasoning "testers might be entitled to attorneys' fees if they recover
nominal damages." Yelnosky,.supra note 2, at 442 n.179. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1994), recently adopted
the test from Justice O'Connor's concurrence and awarded $10,000 in attorneys' fees
in a prisoner's excessive force case where the plaintiff recovered $1 in compensatory
damages and $1 in punitive damages. Id. at 423-24. If Justice O'Connor's test became
the prevailing view of the Supreme Court's attorneys' fees jurisprudence, I might be
more optimistic about the chances for prevailing testers to recoup their fees as a matter of course. However, one student author recently suggested an award of attorneys'
fees would not be a sufficient incentive for tester plaintiffs because the cost of administering a tester program would not be recoverable as attorneys' fees. Navarro,
supra note 180, at 2736.
188. Clark, supra note 1, at 32-34.
189. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 445 n.196.
190. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
191. Id. at 242, 258.
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unlawful motivation, even if the employer met its burden of
proving that it would have come to the same conclusion
absent the discriminatory motive. 192
Professor Clark suggests that I have read incorrectly this
provision to authorize attorneys' fees only in mixed motive
cases. 193 To the contrary, "[i]n passing this section ... Congress's clear intent was to deal with situations in which mixed
motives existed at the time the employer made the decision." 194
The language of the provision reflects that intent. A court may
grant the limited fees authorized by section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
if the plaintiff "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice"195 and the "respondent demonstrates that the respondent
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." 196 Plainly, then, "[s]ection
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) ... applies only to mixed-motive Title VII
cases in which the defendant proves that the same decision
would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory
motive." 197
Professor Clark incorrectly asserts that prevailing testers will
be able to avail themselves of this provision even if they are not
arguing that they received unequal treatment because of mixed
motives. I agree with Professor Clark that in one way the
prevailing tester plaintiff and the prevailing mixed motive
plaintiff are. similarly situated: they both prove that the
employer engaged in discriminatory behavior. 198 That similarity,
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that a court may grant attorneys'
fees and costs "directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
2000e-2(m)," which provides that it is unlawful to base an employment decision on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, "even though other factors also
motivated the practice." Id. § 2000e-2(m).
193. Clark, supra note 1, at 33.
194. Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion ofA~er
Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 191 (1993); see also
H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45-49 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-87 (allowing courts to award attorneys' fees and other appropriate relief in cases where the employee demonstrates discrimination but fails
to establish it as the sole cause).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
197. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (D.
Md. 1994).
198. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 445 n.196 (noting that an underlying premise of
the provision is that an individual who proves that the employer's acts were inconsistent with Title Vll's proscriptions should be entitled to attorneys' fees expended
in proving that case).
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however, does not change the plain language of the statute. A
tester is only a mixed motive plaintiff if the tester was treated
in a discriminatory manner for lawful and unlawful reasons. A
prevailing party tester ordinarily proves her Title VII rights
were violated by showing that an impermissible factor such as
race was the reason she received disparate treatment. That she
may not be entitled to relief sufficient to obtain attorneys' fees
does not transform her case to one based on mixed motives.
Congress "neither contemplated nor condoned using the carefully
crafted mixed motives standard in cases in which the employer
did not even know about the [lawful] reason [for disparate
treatment at the time the decision was made] ." 199 Professor
Clark's assertion that Congress could not have intended the
prevailing "single motive" tester plaintiff to be in a worse
position than the prevailing mixed-motive plaintiff simply
ignores the fact that Congress did not consider the issue. 200
Finally, Professor Clark challenges my expressed concern
that relying on private groups and individuals to engage in an
optimal amount of testing might be unwise because employers
might deter private groups and individuals from using testers
by asserting various claims against them. 201 I speculated that
employers might sue testers and their counsel for breach of
contract or fraud, or argue that their conduct violates ethical,
criminal, or civil common-law proscriptions on conduct. that
"stirs up litigation" or bars attorneys from contacting
represented parties. 202 Although my concerns were somewhat
speculative and discussed out of an abundance of caution, I
accurately predicted that employers might assert such claims.
Recently, defendants in a housing discrimination case
brought by testers asserted RICO counterclaims against the
plaintiffs. 203 Although the court ultimately dismissed these

199. McGinley, supra note 194, at 191-92.
· 200. Even if the intent and language of section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) could be interpreted to apply it to situations that do not involve mixed motives, district courts are
not required to award fees under the provision. See, e.g., Lewis v. American Foreign
Serv. Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1993). Relying on Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 556
(1992), the Lewis court denied fees to a mixed-motive plaintiff because in section
2000e-5(g}(2}(B) "Congress's use of the word 'may'" in relation to a court's granting
attorneys' fees, "clearly indicates that the Court may exercise its discretion when
awarding the relief allocated in the statute." Lewis, 846 F. Supp. at 83 n.8.
201. Clark, supra note 1, at 34 (commenting on Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 451).
202. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 446-59.
203. In Heights Community Congress v. Smythe, Cramer Co., 862 F. Supp. 204
(N.D. Ohio 1994), the defendant real estate company asserted counterclaims against
the plaintiff testers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
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claims, 204 that case is ample evidence that my concerns about
claims being asserted against testers to deter the use of the
practice are not idle ruminations. Therefore, Professor Clark's
comments about some of the other claims that might be
asserted against testers warrant some response.
First, he asserts that "[m]any of [my] claims regarding
potential unethical activity have been refuted" in a recent
law review article by Alex Oh. 205 Professor Clark fails to
mention that Oh concluded that counsel who organize testing
activities may engage in unethical conduct in what would
appear to be a very common testing scenario. 206 Oh reasoned
that an attorney might violate ethical proscriptions against
misrepresentation if the attorney was responsible for altering
facts on a tester's resume, and the employer offered a job to
the tester, relying on the misrepresentation. 207 Oh also recogniZed, as I had suggested,208 that lawyers and other private
parties engaged in testing are more likely to run afoul of
ethical proscriptions when they engage in testing for their
own pecuniary gain. 209
I continue to think it prudent to acknowledge the potential
problems with relying exclusively on the private market to
produce the optimum amount and type of employment testing
to improve the enforcement regime of Title VII. At times,
Professor Clark himself seems to acknowledge these problems. He states that public policy concerns about misrepresentations made in the course of testing should encourage
Congress to authorize the EEOC to determine when and how

(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and Ohio's Corrupt Activities Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-.36 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994),
arguing that the testers' organization "used settlement demands and threats to sue
merely for the purpose of fund-raising." 862 F. Supp. at 207.
204. Heights Community Congress, 862 F. Supp. at 207.
205. Clark, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Oh, supra note 63).
206. Oh, supra note 63, at 489. Clark also neglects to mention that Oh concluded
that testers who act in a way to encourage employers to reject them "entrap" the
employers. Id. a,t 503-04. In light of that concern, Oh argued for EEOC coordination
and oversight. Id. at 504. I argued in my original article and still believe that
testing does not constitute entrapment, Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 474-81, but I
also argued then, as I do now, that EEOC oversight and coordination of testing
activities in the employment area is desirable. Id. at 483. Clark agrees with me.
Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40.
207. Oh, supra note 63, at 487 n.61.
208. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 451-52.
209. Oh, supra note 63, at 490.

FALL 1994)

Salvaging the Opportunity

189

misrepresentations may be made in employment testing. 210
He is similarly ambivalent in responding to my conclusion
that the state law hurdles that could be placed in the way of
private testers would not be preempted by Title VIl. 211 He
claims in one section of his article that "if federal law gives
private parties a right to test to litigate against employment
discrimination, then these state law claims will be preempted
if they unduly burdened that right." 212 Later, however, he
writes that "[a]rguments that state legislation which prohibits misrepresentations in the employment application process
were preempted would probably fail. "213 Regardless of where
Professor Clark ultimately comes out on this issue, I stand by
my previous. analysis of it. 214

210. I first expressed the concern about liability for misrepresentation in my
original article. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 449-50. I also suggested that Congress
should legislate in this area. Id. at 482-83.
211. Id. at 471-73.
212. Clark, supra note 1, at 35.
213. Id. at 48 n.238.
214. Professor Clark tries to dismiss most of the concerns I raised about a
tester's lack of interest in employment with the tested employer by asserting that
"[t)esters are not that different from bona fide applicants who ultimately turn down
a job offer." Clark, supra note 1, at 35. They can be undeniably different, however,
with regard to their intent to consider accepting an offer of employment. I recognized in my earlier article that applicants often test the waters to see if other
employment opportunities are available and otherwise solicit offers they are not
serious about accepting. Therefore, it is customary that the employer runs the risk
in the initial stages of considering whether to offer a job to an applicant that the
applicant is not serious about entertaining an offer of employment. Yelnosky, supra
note 2, at 450 n.218. However, if the applicant becomes aware that the employer is
expending significant amounts of time and money considering his suitability for
employment or may be bypassing other qualified candidates, which is often the case
in the latter stages of hiring for higher-skilled, upper-level positions, there may be
liability in tort for failing to disclose the lack of a good faith intention to consider an
offer. Id.
Professor Clark implies that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said
something important about the relief issues in Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th
Cir. 1971). Clark, supra note 1, at 37 n.185. Professor Clark's reasoning here is
difficult to follow. In Lea the court held that the district court erred in concluding
that tester plaintiffs who prevailed in a Title VII action in obtaining an injunction
against defendant's discriminatory hiring practices were not entitled to recover
attorneys' fees. Lea, 438 F.2d at 88. The case has no precedential value on the
attorneys' fees issue, because it was decided some 20 years before the Supreme
Court articulated its current attorneys' fees jurisprudence. If Professor Clark is
suggesting that the court in Lea addressed the issue of tester standing, he is simply
wrong. Standing questions were not relevant to the posture of that case, and the
court never mentioned any standing issues. See, e.g., Oh, supra note 63, at 4 78 n.21.
("The majority opinion did not address the issueO of standing .... Consequently,
the decision serves only a minor role in assessing the present controversy.").
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IV. THE FAIR HOUSING INITIATIVES PROGRAM

After sorting through Professor Clark's article, I have concluded that he agrees with my central conclusions: the EEOC
should take some leadership role in implementing enforcement testing to uncover hiring discrimination, 215 and some
congressional action is necessary in this area. 216
Professor Clark recognizes that testing programs should be
as fair as possible and acknowledges (1) the public policy implications of testers misrepresenting their qualifications, 217
(2) the additional costs to employers associated with checking
all of an applicant's statements to determine whether the applicant submitted a false application, 218 (3) the possible cost
an employer might incur by hiring and then having to fire an
unqualified tester, 219 and (4) the threat of tester liability for
misrepresentations made to employers concerning job qualifications. 220 He responds to these concerns, in part, by arguing
for EEOC oversight and congressional action, 221 recognizing
that some of the state law obstacles to testing by private
parties may be preempted if Congress specifically authorized
the practice. 222 He also writes:
Arguably, either the EEOC should be the only entity allowed to arm its staff with false credentials, or other organizations should be required to obtain approval from
the EEOC. Because the employment testing process is
much more complicated than testing in the housing arena, Congress should consider funding the EEOC to provide training and guidance to private organizations. 223
While he suggests that employers should not be targeted for
testing unless there is some reason to believe that they are
currently engaged in discriminatory hiring practices, he fails
to recognize that this limitation would require legislative

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40.
Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 48.
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action. 224 Professor Clark also states that the EEOC should
share information with others in order to help testers avoid
targeting employers who are not likely to be engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. 225
As I stated earlier, I think Professor Clark's time could
have been better spent if he had acknowledged that he
agreed with much of what I had written and used more of his
response to my article to prompt a dialogue that would give
the EEOC and Congress real guidance in reconsidering the
role of the EEOC in enforcing Title VII, and the possible
place for enforcement testing in a new vision of that role.
Now that I have clarified where we really stand on these
issues, I want to highlight an existing_ model of public/private
partnership in the enforcement of federal civil rights legislation through the use of testers-the Fair Housing Initiatives
Program (FHIP). 226 Congress should consider adopting a
similar program to organize and utilize enforcement testing
in employment in a more meaningful and systematic way.
Many of the arguments Professor Clark and I have made
here suffer from a lack of empirical support. In some ways, as
I suggested, some of our differences are really based on a
more or less optimistic prediction of future events. He agrees
with me that testing is necessary, that it can be reliable and
cost-efficient when utilized properly, and that it should be
used in instances where it fills an existing enforcement void.
The best way to move us forward from here is to gather more
empirical data to support conclusions on the proper context of
employment law enforcement testing. A program like the
FHIP can do that. 227
Congress authorized the FHIP in section 561 of the Fair
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987. 228 Under
the FHIP the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
224. See supra notes 103-12, 117-19 and accompanying text.
225. Clark, supra note 1, at 38.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993).
227. I am not the first to suggest the FHIP could be a model for incorporating
the testing technique into the EEOC's enforcement strategy. See, e.g., Penda D.
Hair, Civil Rights, in CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 334, 340 (Mark Green ed., 1992) (arguing that as part of an aggressive enforcement program, the Clinton Administration should support a federally funded
employment testing effort by developing the employment equivalent of the FHIP
program); Fix et al., supra note 37, at 45 (suggesting that policy makers should
consider whether it is appropriate for the federal government to help build an infrastructure of private organizations to resemble the fair housing councils).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993).
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was authorized to provide funds to non-profit organizations
or other private entities "to conduct a variety of activities,
including testing, in support of fair housing enforcement."229
The program was authorized as a two-year demonstration to
provide Congress with an opportunity to review the actual
experiences with the program. 230 During this period, the
Secretary was directed to "establish guidelines for testing activities funded under the private enforcement initiative ... to
ensure that investigations in support of fair housing enforcement efforts . . . develop credible and objective evidence of
discriminatory housing practices."231 The conference committee that reported out the final bill urged the Secretary, when
preparing the testing guidelines, to:
give particular consideration to the comments and suggestions of both housing industry members (including those
that have been the subjects of testing or otherwise involved
in the testing process) and of private and public agencies
that have practical experience in the use of testing as an
instrument for securing rights under fair housing laws. 232
Under the statute, the guidelines applied only to activities
funded by the Secretary. Thus, the guidelines were intended
to have no impact on the use of evidence secured through testing not funded by the Secretary in any legal proceeding
brought to secure a right or remedy available under the federal
fair housing laws. Those guidelines 233 set forth (1) specific

229. H.R. REP. No. 122(1), lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3406.
230. Id. at 293, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3444. The Secretary was required to file a
quarterly report with the relevant House and Senate committees detailing the activities funded under the section. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561(b)(2), 101 Stat. 1942,
1943 (1988).
231. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561(c)(2), 101 Stat. 1942, 1943 (1988) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(0(2)(Supp. V 1993)). According to the House Report
on the bill, the Secretary's guidelines were to "(1) contain measures necessary to
ensure that such testing [was) objective, reliable, and controlled; (2) guarantee the
credibility and probative value of testing evidence; and (3) preclude the misuse of
the funds under the Program." H.R. REP. No. 122(1), supra note 229, at 90-91, 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3406-07. The Committee stated explicitly that the Secretary should
not interfere with any remedies currently provided under federal fair housing laws.
Id. at 91, 19.87 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3407.
232. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 426, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3458, 3537.
233. The guidelines for testing funded under the FHIP are codified at 24 C.F.R.
§ 125.405 (1994).
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applicant eligibility requirements, (2) a detailed description of
procedures to be followed in the conduct of funded testing, and
(3) performance monitoring requirements. For example, the
guidelines address the targeting issue. Funded testing may
only be conducted in response to a bona fide allegation of a
discriminatory housing practice. 234 The agency justified this
limitation on the ground that the program was a demonstration
of limited duration with limited financial resources that Congress supported to enforce the fair housing laws, not to conduct
research into the extent of housing discrimination. 235
The guidelines address reliability and tester matching issues
as well. In an attempt to establish a method of obtaining
credible and objective evidence through funded fair housing
testing, the guidelines specify how many testers must visit an
entity targeted by a bona fide allegation. The guidelines also
address how closely the testers' characteristics and alleged
housing needs must match those of the individual who made the
bona fide allegation or those of the other testers. 236 A funded
program may not recruit as a tester any individual with a prior
felony conviction or a conviction of a crime involving fraud or
perjury. 237 The guidelines forbid a tester or funded organization
from having an economic interest in the outcome of the test
other than any interest in damages that may be' awarded by a
court for a fair housing law violation. 238 They also forbid any
other "bias or conflict of interest which would prevent or limit
[the] objectivity or fairness [of the test]." 239 Testers are forbidden
from contacting each other during testing about the conduct of
the test, testing experiences, or results. 240 The agency uses an
application process to try to assure that funded organizations

234. Id. § 125.405(b)(l).
235. Fair Housing Initiatives Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 6492 (1989) (codified at 24
C.F.R. § 125 (1994)). As discussed, Professor Clark would target employers for testing
if minorities or women were statistically underrepresented in their workforces. Clark,
supra note 1, at 24 n.119. Other targeting techniques have been suggested, such as
a history of discrimination, tips from any source, jobs involving substantial contact
with the public, or jobs that are valuable or plentiful. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at
355. There are proponents of purely random testing, e.g., Hair, supra note 227, at
338-39, but critics fear that without strict guidelines, testing could be used for ulterior
motives. Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 239.
236. 24 C.F.R. § 125.405(b)(3),(c)(2)(iii),(iv) (1994).
237. Id. § 125.405(c)(l).
238. Id. § 125.405(c)(3)(i).
239. Id. § 125.405(c)(3)(ii).
240. Id. § 125.405(c)(2)(ii).
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have experience in the area and will follow the funding
guidelines. 241
In 1990, Congress reauthorized the program and funded it to
extend the demonstration period to September 30, 1992. 242
Congress reauthorized and amended the program most recently
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. 243
Congress removed the demonstration period provision, establishing the FHIP as a permanent program. It determined that
testing "is a valid and necessary component of fair housing
investigative and enforcement activities."244 The Secretary is
currently undertaking a review of the testing guidelines. 245
Congress made other relevant changes to the FHIP in 1992.
It authorized the Secretary of HUD to use funds to develop,
organize, and build the capacity of existing fair housing organizations to engage in investigative activities and to form
and establish new organizations 246 in unserved or underserved
areas as well as areas where there are large concentrations of
members of protected classes. 247 Congress also · expressed
enthusiasm for expanding the use of testers to uncover discrimination in mortgage lend1.ng practices 248 and specifically
authorized the Secretary to fund testing intended to uncover
discrimination in "the making or purchasing of loans or the
provision of other financial assistance." 249 The Secretary will

241. Id. § 125.405(d).
242. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625,
§ 953(a),(b), 104 Stat. 4419 (1990).
243. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905, 106 Stat. 3638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a
(Supp. V 1993)).
244. 59 Fed. Reg. 44,598 (1994).
245. Because the testing guidelines were to be used during the authorized
demonstration period, and because that period expired, HUD is proposing to eliminate
most of the testing guidelines. It will still require that testers have no prior felony
convictions or convictions of crimes involving fraud or perjury and that the testers
receive training or be experienced in testing procedures or techniques. Id. at 44,596.
246. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905(b)(2), 106 Stat. 3869 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3616a (b)(2)(A),(C),(D) (Supp. V 1993)).
247. 59 Fed. Reg. 44,600 (1994). In issuing rules under these provisions, HUD
intends to make "this category of funding broadly available," 59 Fed. Reg. 44,601
(1994), and to target areas identified by, inter alia, "the amount of funds available;
the absence in an area of substantially equivalent State or local agencies, or private
enforcement groups; and the presence of large concentrations of protected classes."
Id.
248. H.R. REP. No. 760, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, 3437.
249. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § &05(b)(2)(B), 106 Stat. 3869 (1992) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3616a(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993)).
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be required to report to Congress annually on the administration of the program. 250

CONCLUSION

A funded testing program modeled along the lines of the
FHIP seems to be a desirable next step in the development of
the use of testers to enforce equal employment opportunity
laws. The program can be used as a model for Congress and
the EEOC to begin to integrate this new enforcement technique
into the Title VII arsenal. The period of deliberation by Congress, as well as the subsequent public comment period associated with any EEOC rulemaking, are opportunities to air,
debate, and test some of the issues Professor Clark and I, as
well as others, have discussed here and elsewhere. Perhaps
through the use of a demonstration period like that originally
authorized under the FHIP we can move beyond speculation
and conjecture and begin to produce the empirical evidence
necessary to evaluate usefully the efficacy of using testers to
uncover and remedy discrimination in hiring.
Issues such as the efficacy of testing for discrimination in
hiring for higher-skilled jobs can be debated, tested, and hopefully revisited. Various techniques for targeting firms for testing can be debated and tested. More debate and empirical data
on the need for misrepresentations of qualifications and the
permissible types of misrepresentations in testing are
necessary. Funds could be used, as they were in the FHIP, to
develop more organizations capable of conducting reliable
employment testing to further fill the Title VII enforcement
void. Finally, by permitting unfunded groups to operate simultaneously,251 which I assume Professor Clark would prefer, the

250.

Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905(j), 106 Stat. 3872 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 3616a(j) (Supp. V 1993)).

251. For several reasons, I took the position in my original article that there would
be benefits to comprehensive congressional legislation in this area to set the permissible boundaries and techniques of employment law enforcement testing. For example,
testing could be limited to uncovering discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entrylevel jobs; disincentives caused by the inability of parties to recover attorneys' fees
could be changed through legislation; and state law obstacles to testing could be
preempted. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 483. A program like FHIP would be a more
incremental approach, permitting the use of testing to evolve as our understanding
of potential costs and benefits increases.
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law may be permitted to develop in this area and funded testing can continue unabated so that ifl am right that incentives
to promote testing are not sufficient, the technique will continue to be developed.
My final point, then, is a simple one. While I welcome the
opportunity Professor Clark's article has given me to discuss
further the ideas I first presented in my original article, to
move forward from here we need to concentrate on developing
and implementing the testing technique. Only then can we
hope to make truly wise decisions about the efficacy of this
practice.

